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Abstract  
It is well known that despite his close engagement with cinema, Gilles Deleuze was less concerned with 
animated film, being somewhat dismissive of its capabilities. In recent years, however, a number of attempts 
have been made - most notably by William Schaffer, Thomas Lamarre, and Dan Torre to construct 
Deleuzian positions in animation theory. This paper outlines some of these approaches, whilst engaging 
critically with Torre’s writings. In particular, it foregrounds Torre’s neglect of the post-structural, political 
dimension of Deleuzian thought, through an examination of the concepts of faciality, the close up, and 
relation as they occur in Deleuzian and Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy.  This is in part facilitated through 
a comparison of Stuart Blackton's Humorous Phases of Funny Faces (1906) – a work directly addressed by 
Torre, and Emile Cohl's Fantasmagorie (1908) – a work which he largely passes by. It is claimed here, that 
despite a number of apparent similarities, the animations of Cohl and Blackton express a radically divergent 
series of ontological commitments. Cohl offers the audience an experience of chaotic, mutable, relational 
complexity that revels in its incoherence, whilst Blackton presents a series of more straightforward set 
pieces, dwelling for the most part upon object-centric representational form. The tension between 
representation and becoming that occurs between these works is employed to facilitate a critical 
engagement with Torre’s process-cognitivism. It is suggested that Torre’s work, though exceptional in its 
pedagogic value, is likewise expressive of this tension, and that in its effort firstly to combine a series of 
process philosophical and cognitivist ideas, and secondly to unpack the radical ideas of Deleuze through 
the more conservative philosophy of Nicholas Rescher, it runs the risk of falling back into a quasi-Kantian 
philosophy of generality and representation. 
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The philosopher Gilles Deleuze devoted little space to the discussion of animation. Indeed, as William 
Schaffer has noted, on the one and only occasion when he did address the subject, he was somewhat 
dismissive of its capabilities, positioning the animated film as a subset of early cinema - as something which 
was closely related to the early, and for the most part live-action films that were analysed in order to develop 
his notion of the cinematic movement and action images (Schaffer, 2006: 456; Deleuze, 2005). For Deleuze, 
cinema before the Second World War was broadly concerned with the ordering and narrativisation of events 
– with the construction or description of a situation through the controlled distribution of movement (or 
sections of movement) in space (Bogue, 2003: 108). According to Deleuze, it was out of this highly 
structured approach to movement that pre-war cinema first developed its repertoire of cinematic techniques, 
such as the cut, the close-up and the long shot (Deleuze, 2005: 31-33).  
In his second volume of writings on film, Deleuze went on to contrast this mode of linear spatio-temporal 
organisation with a cinema of the time image, which he claimed emerged out of the postwar climate of 
Italian neo realism and French new wave (Deleuze, 2000: 1-13). For Deleuze, time images served to contest 
the primarily object and action-oriented agenda of pre-war cinema. More closely associated with 
experimental approaches to film making, they offered a somewhat unmoored, syncretic vision of a 
crystalline reality that was ultimately resistant to capture and closure. Deleuze’s notion of the time image 
suggests a picture of perception that is partial, associative, fleeting, intensive and less directly linked to the 
regularities of sensory-motor action (Deleuze, 2005: 205-219).  
Despite Deleuze’s somewhat lackluster engagement with the animated film, a number of latter-day 
animation theorists have seen significant resonance between animated phenomena and a series of core 
Deleuzian concerns. In recent years, various attempts have been made - most notably by Schaffer (2007), 
Lamarre (2009, 2010), Torre (2013, 2015, 2017) and Jenkins (2016) - to construct a series of Deleuzian 
positions in animation theory. This reappraisal of the significance of Deleuzian thought with respect to the 
formulation of a theory of animation in many ways mirrors Deleuze’s own re-evaluation of the philosopher 
Henri Bergson’s relationship to cinema (Deleuze, 2005: 1-3). Writing in the early twentieth century, 
Bergson - one of Deleuze’s most significant philosophical progenitors – had been highly critical of the then 
only recently invented cinematic apparatus, arguing that the cinematograph dissected the flow of time into 
a series of petrified instants, which were then illegitimately reconstituted as a form of false, illusory and 
overly analytical movement (Bergson, 1944: 295-377). When developing his own account of cinema, 
Deleuze suggested that Bergson’s critique had been misplaced, and that it had arisen partly out of the 
philosopher only having experienced the cinematic apparatus in its relatively crude, nascent state, with low, 
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sometimes hand-cranked frame rates and fluctuating levels of exposure. According to Deleuze, the outputs 
of a more technologically and artistically developed cinema, were highly resonant with the image-centric 
ontology that was the cornerstone of Bergson’s own philosophical thinking as developed in his Matter and 
Memory (Bergson, 2005: 9-10). That is to say, Bergson, attempting to walk a line between materialism and 
idealism, had proposed a metaphysics in which the world was ultimately constituted not by rigid and 
unyielding material objects, nor by overly ethereal or ephemeral ideas, but by a plethora of flowing and 
interacting ‘material-images’. For Deleuze - who both inherited and developed many of Bergson’s ideas - 
this would seem to be the very thing which the cinema of his own time, was able to provide. 
 
The growing interest in Deleuze in the context of animation studies, serves as a testament to a similar re-
appraisal of Deleuzian thought that could be said to be taking place with respect to the theorisation of 
animation. That is to say, for a number of contemporary animation theorists, Deleuze’s dismissal of 
animation as a subset of pre-war cinema would seem to have been similarly overhasty – serving to occlude 
the highly mutable, plastic character of animated form, which is very much in tune with Deleuze’s own 
process-philosophical depiction of reality not only as a ‘matter flow of universally interacting matter 
images’ (Bogue, 2003: 38) but also as a highly metamorphic process of transformation, or ‘becoming’. For 
a growing number of animation theorists, the metamorphic and kinetic aspects of reality that Deleuzian 
philosophy would seem to at once foreground, idealise, and venerate, are the very things that animation – 
if thought on its own terms and taken out of the shadow of cinema in general – is capable of delivering.  
 
Torre’s Approach to Process and Cognition  
 
It is not unusual for Deleuze’s commentators to position Deleuze, like Bergson before him, as a philosopher 
of process (Mullarkey, 2006; Williams, 2003). Most recently, in the context of animation studies, Dan 
Torre’s writings have made explicit some of the connections between Deleuzian ideas, process-
philosophical thinking and the production and consumption of animation. Torre’s work draws attention to 
the kinetic aspects of process thought - the way in which it presents reality as flux, the way in which it 
attempts to dispense with nouns whilst prioritising verbs, and the way in which it depicts the world as a 
multiplicity of processes that are in some sense nested or layered together (Torre, 2014: 49, 56; Torre, 2017: 
8, 126, 168, 188, 208). Thus, Torre emphasises the dynamism and the openness of process philosophy - its 
distinctive presentation of the kinetic, creative, developmental character of reality – aligning this with the 
notion of ‘becoming’ that he sees as being foregrounded in the work of Deleuze, and noting the resonance 
between these ideas and the practice of animation (Torre, 2014: 49-50; Torre, 2017: 8-9, 163).  
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In this sense, Torre could be said to have further radicalised Lev Manovich’s claim - influential in the field 
of expanded animation - that given its dependence upon the phi-phenomenon, and given the amount of 
digital manipulation a ‘live action’ film typically undergoes, cinema per se has a far weaker connection 
than was once thought with the indexical, photographic image, and that as a consequence contemporary 
cinema should perhaps more properly be thought as a subset of animation (Manovich, 2001: 34, 294-298). 
Manovich’s claim can be seen to have problematised two of the most traditional responses to the animated 
film that occur in the context of film theory - namely the tendency to present cinema as an all-encompassing 
category which serves ultimately to envelop animation (which is echoed in Deleuze’s all too brief 
engagement with the subject), and the tendency to exclude or to dismiss animation as a medium of artifice 
– or to present it as cinema’s illegitimate heir. In his most recent work in animation theory, Torre could be 
said to push Manovich’s position further - going beyond an analysis of any specific medium or technology 
of representation, choosing instead to internalise processes of animation and to emphasise their constitutive 
role in cognition, perception and imagination. It is in this sense that, for Torre, the process of animation per 
se transcends any specific medium, becoming the very condition of experience itself.  
 
From the perspective of Deleuzian philosophy, Torre’s work is useful in its ability to shed light upon some 
of Deleuze’s philosophical concepts (from relatively accessible ideas such as assemblage through to more 
esoteric notions such as non-linear temporality). Whilst Deleuze’s prose is often exuberant and exhilarating 
in character, it can at first glance, seem willfully obscure and highly esoteric. Accordingly, Torre’s more 
sober account of assimilated, fragmented and layered representation is pedagogically useful, and can be 
instructive in helping to understand Deleuze’s position - drawing attention, for instance, to the way in which 
moments of perception and processes of imagination might ‘assimilate various diverse memories’ (Torre, 
2014: 55; Torre, 2017: 113) - combining ‘the walk cycle of our brother and the lip-synched mouth 
movements of our neighbour’ in order to apply them in a moment of imaginative reverie to a ‘person whom 
we only briefly noticed sitting across from us on the train’ (Torre, 2014: 55; Torre, 2017: 113).  
Deleuze’s Critique of Cognitive Representation 
 
When seen from a more orthodox Deleuzian perspective, however, the exceptional clarity of Torres’ writing 
does not come without a price. Arguably, in attempting to formulate a process-cognitivist position, he 
endeavors to assimilate two lines of enquiry that appear difficult to straightforwardly reconcile in the 
context of Deleuzean thought. On the one hand, he addresses the processual dimension of Deleuzean 
philosophy - foregrounding the kinetic, the transformative and the absolute ontological priority of the new. 
On the other hand, however, he endeavors to assimilate this processual dimension of Deleuze’s thinking 
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with a number of theories arising out of cognitive science – a discipline which traditionally couples the 
schematic modelling of information systems with the findings of contemporary neuroscience in order to 
addresses our faculties of representation.  
 
Torre’s Tacit Kantianism 
Whilst there is clearly a processual dimension to much contemporary cognitive theory, it is important to 
recognise that Deleuze considered Immanuel Kant – the philosopher most often positioned as the founding 
figure of cognitivism – as his philosophical ‘enemy’ (Deleuze, 1984: xv). For Deleuze, the error of Kantian 
thought lay firstly in its entrenchment of structure into our perception of the world through the 
internalisation of a mode of representation, and secondly in its presumption that any encountered thing is 
only another identifiable instance of an already existing concept. For Deleuze this recognition-oriented, 
representational aspect of Kantian thought was dangerous in so far as it served to neutralise the power of 
difference, and to subtract any potential for genuinely creative encounter (Deleuze, 2001: 176-177; 
Lefebvre, 2008: 2-3, 59-62). For Deleuze, in the context of Kantian philosophy, experiential novelty was 
usurped through apriori acts of recognition which served to divest thought of any potential for creativity – 
presenting it instead as an organ of identification (Deleuze, 2001: 303).  
Whilst Torre’s process-cognitivism clearly stresses both the distributed and fragmented character of 
perception, foregrounding the multiple layers of processing (image, movement and colour, for instance) 
that are synthesised in any phenomenal outcome, it likewise expresses a number of Kantian traits. This is 
perhaps most noticeable in Torre’s leaning towards identity and generality - indeed, it seems significant 
that Torre’s exposition dwells for the most part upon seemingly vital, but nevertheless figurative animated 
form – the ‘boiling lines’ of William Kentridge and Bill Plympton, along with the ‘living sketches’ of Stuart 
Blackton and Lev Yilmaz (Torre, 2015; Torre, 2017). Arguably, this emphasis upon animated objects and 
animated characters is accompanied by a similarly quasi-Kantian conception of the self (or subject) as the 
owner or producer of phenomenal experience. Like many contemporary cognitivists, Torre attempts to walk 
something of a middle line, developing an account of perception and mental imaging which attempts to 
synthesise ‘top-down’, representational aspects of cognition, with a ‘bottom up’ more materialist analysis 
that signposts the at once processual, distributed, and somewhat chaotic operation of our neuro-
physiological processes. The materialism of the latter is perhaps more in tune with Deleuze’s own 
philosophical position, and it is this that is foregrounded in Torre’s account. This ‘bottom up’ aspect of 
Torre’s position stresses the way in which our perception is constantly in process, how it depends upon 
embodied movement (the rapid movement of the eyes, alongside movements of the head and torso) and 
how perception itself might be considered an at once dynamic and synthetic process of sketching (Torre, 
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2014: 53; Torre, 2017: 107). However, there are moments when this bottom up analysis shades into, and 
ultimately gives way to a top-down approach in so far as Torre suggests that that the resulting ‘fragmented 
saccades of [a] scene are amalgamated in our working memory’ (Torre, 2014: 53) where they are subjected 
to multiple layers of processing. Torre goes on to argue in a decidedly more Kantian fashion, that the 
‘saccadic-fragments of visual information’ create a ‘visual trace image’, and then ‘generate cognitive 
images by a multifaceted compositing of stored imagery elements’ (Torre, 2017: 125-126). Ultimately, in 
focusing upon the processual machinations of our perception of coherent form, a more strongly delineated 
conception of self emerges, whilst the more radical, post-structural, political orientation of Deleuzian 
philosophy becomes somewhat obscured, along with its emphasis upon affective, potentialistic, and 
relational modes of transformation.  
Comparison of Cohl and Blackton 
Torre’s occlusion of the poststructuralist orientation of Deleuzian thought becomes particularly apparent 
when we consider his selection of Stuart Blackton’s Humorous Phases of Funny Faces (1906) as a vehicle 
for clarifying the affinity between animation and process-philosophical thinking. As we shall see, in 
focusing almost exclusively upon the way in which Blackton’s film reveals processes of drawing and 
erasure that are ordinarily hidden, Torre sidesteps the rich territory for political discussion that might be 
facilitated by an examination of the content, and the ontological assumptions of Blackton’s film. This seems 
like something of a missed opportunity given that there is much discussion of the affective and political 
dimensions of the face in both the sole authored writings of Deleuze and the collaborative works of Deleuze 
and Guattari. Discussion of the face is prominent not only in Deleuze’s writings on the affective dimension 
of the close-up in his first volume on cinema, where he considers the ‘intensive’ nature of the close-up and 
the face as an emitter of affective signs, but also in Deleuze and Guattari’s writings on faciality in A 
Thousand Plateaus, where the face emerges as a form of over-coded political capture - as a standard by 
which difference is at once identified, problematised and subjected to discipline. With this in mind, it is 
important to recognise that alternative processual lineages of animation might be traced that are more in 
tune with both the political and potentialistic aspects of Deleuzian aesthetics. This might be performed, 
firstly by considering pioneers of non-figurative, abstract animation such as Oskar Fischinger (who Torre 
only briefly addresses, whilst emphasising the more cohesive moments of figuration that at once bookend 
and anchor animated sequences of metamorphosis) and secondly through the anti-essentialist, relational 
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animation of Emile Cohl, a contemporary of Blackton, who is noticeably absent from Torre’s writings, and 
whose work - whilst in some sense figurative - is nevertheless more fluid and chaotic in character.1 
Emile Cohl's Fantasmagorie (1908), stands as an example from the history of animation that is no less 
seminal than Blackton’s work, but which is perhaps more in tune with many of Deleuze’s post-structural, 
process philosophical concerns. Contra Torre, it is claimed here that despite their engagement with the 
process of drawing, and their relatively brief encounter with the smudging and smearing of chalk, Blackton's 
films, are predominately object-, as opposed to process-oriented. In this sense Cohl and Blackton’s 
animations could be said to express a divergent set of ontological commitments, and to follow, or perhaps 
even initiate, divergent trajectories with respect to the history of animation. That is to say, in his emphasis 
upon the kinetic, transformational plasticity of the animated line, Cohl begins a lineage that will encompass 
many forms of animation - from the frenetic Claymation of Bruce Bikford’s Prometheus’ Garden (1988), 
through to the more lyrical, rotoscoped ‘single line’ animation of Kazuhiko Okushita’s The Red Thread 
(2010). Indeed, we might go so far to suggest that it is the legacy of Cohl that stands as the seed for Disney’s 
commercially successful principles of squash, stretch, and overlapping action. Indeed, the relationship 
between Disney’s principles and the paintings of Francis Bacon has been explored by Simon Pummell 
(1998), a relationship that becomes particularly telling, when we consider the large part that an analysis of 
Bacon’s work played in the development of Deleuze’s aesthetics in The Logic of Sensation (Deleuze, 2003). 
 
 
Duration, Possibility and Potentiality 
 
Perhaps the most obvious and notable divergence between Cohl and Blackton’s films relates to what Sergie 
Eisenstein famously described as the ‘plasmaticness’ of animation – that is, its openness, instability, and 
transformative potential (Eisenstein, 1988: 21). This concept has proved attractive to the increasing number 
of animation theorists beginning to explore animation from a Deleuzian perspective. For instance, in his 
discussion of Keiji Nakazawa’s graphic novel, Barefoot Gen, Thomas Lamarre (2010) constructs a concept 
of the ‘plastic line’ out of consideration of its calligraphic qualities. Lamarre explains that his notion of the 
plastic line develops out of Eisenstein’s plasmaticness – and explains how this was contrasted by Eisenstein 
himself with the ‘heartless geometrising’ of Euclid (Lamarre, 2010: 281). Lamarre, draws attention to its 
‘poly-formic’ amoeba like ‘contour’ of the plastic line (Lamarre, 2010: 282) and emphasises the way in 
which it is able to ‘enter into relations’ with other points. In this sense, Lamarre’s plastic line is positioned 
                                                 
1 For an interesting discussion and overview of the pioneers of abstract animation, see Furniss (2008) - it is upon the 
relational complexity of Cohl, however, that we will focus for the remainder of this essay.  
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as potentialistic, transformative and fundamentally transitional in its kinetic capabilities. In a similar 
fashion, Schaffer notes how the on-screen imagistic transformations that are brought about by the self-
affecting ‘invisible hand’ of the animator allow ‘the unexpected, even the impossible, to emerge at any-
point-whatever’ - folding the duration of animator and character whilst also constituting the duration of the 
animated world (Schaffer, 2006: 462-466).  
 
Whilst Schaffer and Lamarre each note an affinity between the hand-drawn and a set of Deleuzo-Bergsonian 
concerns with duration and transformation, it is perhaps Schaffer who develops this idea furthest - noting 
the temporal disparities between the mode of animated production and the mode of animated projection and 
citing Norman McLarren’s comment that ‘what happens between each frame is more important than what 
happens on each frame’ (Schaffer, 2006: 457).  Arguably, such observations are broadly concerned with 
the potentialistic qualities of animation, and as such they serve to problematise, or at least to trouble Torre’s 
slightly restrictive, quasi-Kantian notion, that all forms of movement must fall straightforwardly under 
purely spatial categories (Torre, 2014: 52 ; Torre, 2017: 21).  
 
As we have seen, despite his concern with process, Kantian themes of order and stability frequently manifest 
themselves in Torre’s writings. Kant famously internalised representation, suggesting that anything which 
constitutes an experience must fall under the orderly categories of time, space and relation. In a similar 
fashion, Torre suggests that all movement must fall under a spatial framework of ‘up, down, forward, back, 
left, right, accumulation and dispersion’ (Torre, 2014: 52). Similar tendencies are evident in Torre’s leaning 
towards notions of computational process – he notes, for instance, the way in which an imagined object can 
be ‘mentally rotated’ in a manner that is reminiscent of the machinations of 3D modelling software, and his 
discussion of the multifaceted composition of memory and perceptual experience is likewise suggestive of 
software-based production tools – with Torre frequently invoking interface metaphors, such as the layer 
and the timeline. In this sense, Torre’s approach to process reactivates a discussion prominent in early 
commentary on Deleuze concerning the differences between computational and philosophical senses of 
virtuality. 
 
Computation, Cognitivism and Possibilistic Thought  
 
The Deleuzian theorist and commentator Brian Massumi has noted an affinity between the concept of 
virtuality as it is used in the context of computational thinking and the philosophical concept of possibility 
– stressing its connection with simulation (the computational modelling of the states of affairs).  Massumi 
positions possibilistic thought as being broadly concerned with function, clarity, and the recombination of 
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elements that can readily be envisaged, and which, as such, are already in some sense known. In contrast 
to this, Massumi notes how a focus upon potentiality, which he attributes to Deleuze’s philosophical 
thinking of the virtual, is premised instead upon receptivity to the unknown, the emergence of the 
unprecedented, and the creative capacities of the natural world (Massumi, 2002: 137). For Massumi, the 
philosopher or practitioner oriented by potentialistic thought emphasises the power of contingency, resists 
deterministic and essentialist thinking, whilst welcoming the perpetually new territories that emerge out of 
a network of serendipitous connections largely situated in a virtual, potentialistic, realm.  
 
Torre’s comment, when trying to establish an affinity between processes of animation and processes of 
visual-spatial working memory, that ‘anything is possible in animation and anything is possible in mental 
imagery’ is telling is so far as it serves to foreground the possibilistic orientation of his process-cognitivism 
(Torre, 2014: 57). Central to Deleuze’s critique of Kant is his dismissal of the notion of possibility as a 
creatively limiting recombination of existing generalities. Indeed, it is Torre’s reliance upon a notion of 
processual generality that is perhaps most problematic from the perspective of Deleuzian thought. Torre 
makes much of the concept of the ‘Concrete Universal’ (Torre, 2017: 22) – a notion that he derives from 
the process philosophy of Nicholas Rescher, but which is has its root in the philosophy of Hegel (another 
of Deleuze’s enemies). Following Rescher (2006: 49), Torre suggests that any process is a process of a 
processual type (Torre, 2014: 50) – a process that is an instantiation of a general pattern, and which is 
capable of repetition (at an appropriate level of abstraction). This claim forms the basis of Torre’s idea that 
one of the specificities of the medium of animation is its ability to abstract patterns of movement from one 
entity and then apply them to another - from the Director Ang Lee ‘puppeting’ the CGI instantiation of the 
Hulk using his own body, to the uncanny, anthropomorphic objects of Disney (magical lamps and 
wardrobes that possess human qualities). Whilst there is clearly a resonance here with Deleuzian notions 
of univocity and relational assemblage, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that Torre’s account is 
also symptomatic of the tendency towards generality and possibility that Deleuze so strongly opposed in 
his critique of both Kantian and Hegelian philosophy (Deleuze, 2001). For Deleuze it was the repetition of 
difference, and not identity that was constitutive of reality, as well as its transformation. Significantly, the 
notion of relation – a cornerstone of much process-philosophical thinking on transformative potential - 
though in many ways implicit in much of Torre’s work, is rarely directly addressed. That is to say, in 
accordance with his emphasis on actuality, Torre prefers to unpick the hidden complexity of objects and 
entities as opposed to addressing the nature - and transformative power - of relations per se. 
 
The Striation of the Animated Plane 
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Out of Schaffer and Lamarre’s discussion of the process of drawing by hand, there begins to emerge a 
second, less obvious dichotomy between traditions of art and industrialised animation - the symptoms of 
which can also be clearly located in the works of Cohl and Blackton. This relates to the gradual ordering, 
or – in Deleuzo-Guattarian terms - ‘striation’, of the animated plane – a process that might be connected 
with the development of industrial animation technologies and techniques. The industrialisation of 
animation is typically driven by issues of cost-effectivity and convenience, but also serves to inculcate 
processes of generic and standardised representation. Deleuze and Guattari (2005) famously contrast open, 
potentialistic, ‘smooth’ spaces that can be traversed in an undisciplined nomadic fashion, with more 
disciplined, ordered,  ‘striated’ territories where the potential for movement becomes highly regulated. 
Arguably, the potentialistic character of hand-drawn animation, as well as the specificity of hand-drawn 
characterisation, which are collectively addressed by Schaffer and Lamarre, are in part compromised by the 
gradual industrial striation of the essentially open animated plane through the employment of a series of 
technical apparatuses.  
 
Interestingly, the anti-representational, transformative tendencies that are most prominent in Cohl’s 
Fantasmagorie were entirely produced by hand. Cohl was a member of the ‘Incoherents' - an avante garde 
group of artists who were notorious for their celebration of laughter and the ludicrous (Crafton, 1993: 64). 
His Fantasmagorie offers the audience an experience of chaotic, mutable, relational complexity that revels 
in its incoherence. Indeed, from the perspective of Deleuzian philosophy, one of the most striking things 
about Cohl’s film is the way in which it constructs a plane of almost entirely mutable relations. When 
screening Fantasmagorie to students, I often begin by noting the way in which Cohl’s project seems to 
trouble our faculties of representation and the way in which it would seem to defeat any sense of narrative 
recall. I usually show the film and then simply ask if anyone can tell me what actually happened? Early in 
her book Hollywood Flatlands, Esther Leslie attempts to depict in narrative terms the action that takes place 
in Cohl’s film, describing it as “an illogical narrative of cruelty and torture executed by people and things 
at war with each other". Here is a short fragment from Leslie’s attempt to narrativise the film: 
 
The gentleman sets the lady alight with his cigar, and her head swells into a sphere. For the next 
forty-seven seconds the clown is abused – first by the Michelin man, then by a soldier, then by a 
flower. The clown’s head is ripped off his shoulders and a bottle shaped man bounces it up and 
down in a diablo shaped cup. The bottle-man turns into a bottle and fires its cork. Then it swallows 
up the clown, only to turn into a lotus flower and then into an elephant and finally a house …the 
torture stops …. the clown once repaired…. swells up and floats away. (Leslie, 2002: 1-2) 
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Cohl, Blackton and Faciality 
 
There is something eerily Deleuzian about both the form and content of Cohl’s animation that, as we shall 
see shortly, facilitates reflection upon the multiple senses of the term ‘relation’ that can be located in 
Deleuze’s work. Much like the philosophy of Deleuze, Cohl’s animation seems to privilege mobility over 
stasis, chaos over order and nonsense over sense, collectively reflecting a process-philosophical 
commitment to the emergence of novelty and to the absolute ontological priority of change. In the case of 
Cohl this results in a radical form of both graphical and contextual mutability. It is in this sense that Cohl 
might be seen as an anti-essentialist animator – that is, as an animator less interested in the definitions and 
identities of things and more interested in dynamic vectors of becoming. 
 
Blackton’s more entrenched approach to form and identity is evidenced in his presentation of caricatural 
portraits of male and female faces, along with equally engrained depictions of cultural and racial stereotypes 
that are offered to the audience as entertainment. In an essay on the Creole cartoon, Mark Winokur goes so 
far as to suggest that the Irish characterisation in Blackton’s Humorous Faces is not only stereotypical in 
terms of its graphic representation of physiognomic characteristics, but is also ‘traditionally racist’, with 
characters exhibiting clear traits of ‘Irish temper and alcoholism’ (Winokur, 2012: 59). This is further 
bolstered by his observation that before working as an animator, Blackton had starred in a vaudeville act 
that involved a process of rapid drawing, in which he would produce ‘lightning sketches’ of predominantly 
ethnic stereotypes (Winokur, 2012: 57). Blackton’s act eventually evolved into an animated film of the 
same name. In contrast to the work of Cohl, Blackton’s figures are more strongly delineated – and it seems 
significant that his visual overcodings emerge out of a set of related order words that evoke racial 
stereotypes – specifically those of ‘Cohen’ and ‘Coon’.  
 
Interestingly, Blackton’s more entrenched representations of the caricatured human face, and his somewhat 
stereotypical classifications of race and gender, also make extensive use of a number of time-saving devices 
such as sprocketed limbs, which had been cut out from card, and which, as a consequence, could be quickly 
repositioned (Furniss, 2017: 32). In this sense, Blackton’s work can be seen as a form of proto-industrial 
animation, that would seem to have been prescient not only of animation’s fascination with streamlined 
processes of production, but also with its emphasis upon caricatured representation and the production of 
comedic stereotypes. 
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In Deleuze’s discussion of the face in Cinema 1 (Deleuze, 2005: 87-101), he emphasises the affective 
dimension of the close-up. For Deleuze, the close-up produces an ‘affection image’ extracting the face from 
its surroundings and abolishing any broader situational context. For Deleuze, the face elicits an affective 
power. Thus, we are told that the close up ‘suspends individuation’ giving us ‘both the face and its 
effacement’ (Deleuze, 2005: 100). That is to say, it stands as an expression of material affects that precede 
any notion of subjectivity or ownership. In the context of horror, for instance, the face expresses and 
transmits a curiously impersonal quality of fear that can drift and circulate throughout the world, and serve 
to affect other bodies (Deleuze, 2005: 105-106). Accordingly, it is a somewhat abstract, material quality of 
fear that strikes us – we need not see who, or what is feared, and we need not be closely acquainted with 
the face that expresses the fear. Whilst the example of horror is instructive in helping us to understand the 
migratory aspect of affect and its grounding in material-sensation, it is equally important to recognise that 
the notion of abstraction that Deleuze presents here, is productive as opposed to subtractive, it is premised 
upon a conception of the richness and complexity of the surface of an individual face and upon the equally 
complex confluence of material-affective relations. Thus, it is a confluence of affects that stands as the 
condition of potentiality that grounds subjectivity – providing a threshold between individual ‘worlds’, and 
proceeding through a register of aesthetic contagion. The concept of affect is noticeably absent from Torre’s 
account of animation – although he perhaps comes close to this in his discussion of the operation of mirror 
neurons (Torre, 2017: 111, 168). Torre explains how recent work in neuropsychology has drawn attention 
to the activity of mirror neurons that are said to fire in the brain of a spectator as they watch the movements 
of an actor. Torre states it this: 
 
Mirror neurons are portions of the brain that are activated when we perform a particular physical 
activity. Significantly, the same neurons are activated in an identical manner when we simply see 
the same physical activity being performed by another… part of our brain actually carries out the 
same series of processes and work that it would if we were actually performing the action that 
was witnessed, albeit that they do not culminate in the final action. (Torre, 2017: 111) 
 
Thus, mirror neurons would seem share in, or underpin, an affective logic of contagion. However, it must 
be remembered that such an approach also leans towards a quasi-Kantian notion of universal subject (the 
idea that we are all essentially the same kind of processing unit).  
 
Ultimately, it is the issue of complexity that makes the difference between an expression of potential, and 
a subtractive overcoding. Whilst Deleuze’s embrace of complexity with respect to the face of the affection 
image resists the simplification and political overcoding that may occur at an institutional level, Blackton’s 
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stylistic form of abstraction all too easily slips into a more radically subtractive mode of caricature. Thus, 
in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari emphasise how particular kinds of face support political 
regimes – they argue that the plethora of paintings of the face of Christ that emerge out of Christianity, 
whilst positively engaging with creative, aesthetic potentials, serve also to institute a regime of signs that 
entrenching the face of the average everyday European white male, and as such serve to inculcate and 
support a Christian-political program that Deleuze and Guattari position as inherently oppressive in 
character (Deleuze and Guattari, 2005: 176).  
 
Torre’s writings, though certainly instructive, insightful and accessible are nevertheless - like much 
secondary commentary on Deleuze - necessarily subtractive and partial. Indeed, there is a sense in which 
the Deleuzian corpus itself could be said to have much in common with Deleuze’s conception of the virtual. 
That is to say, Deleuze’s tendency to coin neologisms, hyphenate terms, fuse concepts, shift idiom, and 
engage with non-philosophical territory, presents us with a body of work which seems chaotic and 
overflowing with potential (c.f. Mullarkey, 2006). As a consequence, when engaging with Deleuzian 
thought it becomes necessary to in some sense abstract, determine or ‘actualise’ his philosophy. This gives 
rise to a range of partial readings – or creative closures - of his work in the secondary literature. 
 
Comparison of Deleuze and Rescher 
 
The vestige of representation that is retained in Torre’s account of process, perhaps results from his 
employment of the more conservative processual thinking of Nicholas Rescher (1996; 2000) as a means of 
unpacking the rather more radical and post-structural process thinking of Deleuze. Process philosophy has 
a long intellectual history, having been present as a minor current in Western philosophy since as early as 
540 BC (Rescher, 1996). As a consequence, there are many different kinds of process philosopher, and 
many subtle variations of process thought. Whilst, Deleuze and Rescher have similar ontological 
commitments, their modes of philosophising seem at first glance to place them in stark, incommensurable 
contrast. The idiosyncrasies of Deleuze’s style, his embrace of non-philosophical practices and his wilder, 
more baroque conceptual creations stand in stark contrast to the methodological traditionalism of Rescher. 
Similarly, as Culp (2016) has recently noted, despite the association of Deleuzian philosophy with processes 
of affirmation, Deleuze presents his ideas using an ever evolving, neologistic vocabulary that emphasises 
notions of disjunction (e.g. ‘becoming minor’, ‘line of flight’, ‘deterritorialisation’ and ‘the untimely’), In 
contrast to this, Rescherian process-philosophical thinking, much like Torre’s approach to animation,  
tempers radical notions of transformation and flux by foregrounding the role of meta-stable processual 
constancies. Methodologically, Deleuze approach is diverse – ranging from incisive methodological 
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critique, to highly performative texts in which language is used in an affective fashion to engage, animate 
and stir the reader – enticing them to feel the force of a problem (Williams, 2008: 14). Rescher, on the other 
hand, is more philosophically conservative, exhibiting a stronger commitment to rationality, order and 
clarity of communication. Indeed, Michael Hampe (2004: 286) has criticised Rescher’s recent historical 
survey of process philosophy as entirely ignoring the European process tradition – a tradition which is 
perhaps best represented in its contemporary form by Deleuze. It should be clear from what has been written 
thus far, that for the most part, Torre sidesteps the radical, virtual dimension of Deleuzian philosophy in the 
construction of his process-cognitivism, and leans more closely towards the sobriety and actualism of  
Rescherian thought. 
 
By juxtaposing Rescher’s conservativism with Deleuze’s radicalism, we are able to draw out a subtle intra-
perspectival opposition within the process-philosophical tradition itself – the way in which it could be said 
to be constructed upon an at once integrative and differential fault line. Thus, there is a tendency for process 
philosophers to stress the ontological priority of novelty, transformation and differentiation, whilst 
simultaneously asserting the importance of relational structure, and connectivity in the constitution of 
entities. This process-philosophical schism reveals the importance of relations to the perspective (a topic 
that is prominent in Deleuze’s writings, but which is addressed only indirectly in Torre’s work), and the 
central role that the concept of relation tends to play in the constitution, development and differentiation of 
entities. Relations, then, have a complex, somewhat liminal status - regardless of whether they are 
considered lines of integration, or vectors of transformation, and regardless of whether they are considered 
agents of ‘inter’ or ‘extra’ being, there is a sense in which they are always ontologically ‘in-between’.  
 
The Importance of Relations to Animation and to Deleuzian Philosophy 
 
The Deleuzian scholar Patrick Hayden once suggested that much like Leibniz, all Deleuze does is 
contemplate relations (Hayden, 1995: 283). This is not surprising given the amount of work they have to 
do in his philosophy - fulfilling an at once constitutive, connective and transformational function. In 
Dialogues II, a work co-authored with Claire Parnet, Deleuze aligns himself with a form of empiricism, 
famously claiming that ‘relations are external to their terms’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 41). In emphasizing 
the externality of relations, Deleuze is contesting traditional philosophical notions of fixed, determined and 
timeless essence, whilst stressing the thoroughly contingent nature of the world. For Deleuze, the 
composition of a material situation is at once complex, multiple and thoroughly mutable in character 
(Baines, 2006: 28).  
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Differential, syncretic and political relations could be said to underpin the mutating and chaotic canvas of 
Cohl’s Fantasmagorie. In one sense his figures do battle, but in another they perpetually fuse and 
differentiate - melting and morphing across the projection screen. Films such as Fantasmagorie are notable 
for the way in which they play with context and setting in a highly fluid fashion. A similar, though perhaps 
more identity-centric, trope is evidenced in Osvaldi Cavandoli’s La Linea (1971-1986) and Steve Roberts’ 
more recent Dipdap (2011) – both examples of animated series intended for children, which combine 
Blackton’s process of animated lightning sketching (an image which seems to ‘draw itself’) with the 
contextual mutability that we find in the work of Cohl. 
 
 In animations such as La Linea and Dipdap, new lines - produced by a seen and unseen hand, respectively 
- constantly intervene into situations, modifying and transforming the world and perpetually shifting its 
aspects. The constant, active defamiliarisation that characterises the experience of the protagonsists in each 
of these series, results in a space of perpetual encounter (an encounter that is vicariously experienced by 
the viewing audience), It seems significant, however, that Cohl’s animation, which predates Robert’s 
Dipdap by over a century is not only more radical in its application of plasmatic animation technique but 
is also more subversive with respect to its political content. It is claimed here that Cohl’s animation more 
readily allows us to address the autopoetic transformation of actuality from a material-cultural perspective 
than does Blackton’s Humourous Phases of Funny Faces. Indeed, there is a sense in which we might argue 
that Dipdap is to Fantasmagorie, as Torre is to Deleuze.  
 
Political Subversion in Animation and Deleuzian Philosophy 
 
In addition to its playing with context in a highly fluid fashion, Cohl’s animation is distinctive in its radical 
cultural subversion. In an early essay on carnival and postmodern animated discourse, Terry Lindvall and 
Matthew Melton (1997) explored the way in which the ideas of the Russian linguist and cultural theorist, 
Mikhail Bakhtin, can be seen to resonate with the comedic subversion and self-reflexivity of the animated 
cartoon. With specific reference to Cohl, they note the way in which the cartoon shares the playful and 
subversive dynamism of the carnival spirit - foregrounding the way in which Medieval laughter explored 
and subverted entrenched categories of social and religious existence. Thus, it is characteristic of the 
carnival that the highest echelons of society temporarily stand with the lowest – hierarchies become 
inverted, and the agonistic conditions of the socio-cultural world are briefly rendered visible. In a paper 
published in the second volume of Deleuze Studies, Fred Evans (2006) reveals Bakhtin as a primary source 
of inspiration for Deleuze’s emphasis in The Logic of Sense on voice and indirect discourse as figures (or 
vocalisations) of multiplicity – serving to inform Deleuze’s conception of what Alan Badiou has termed 
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the ‘clamor of being’ (Badiou, 2000). Evans notes how both Deleuze and Bakhtin valorise heterogeneity 
and creativity. With this in mind, the politically mischievous porosity and perpetual transformations of 
Cohl’s animation could be said to contest the rather crude abstraction of Blackton’s overcoded categories 
in a playful, but nevertheless politically motivated fashion. 
 
It would be a mistake to divide Cohl and Blackton in simple binary terms into a ‘good’ subversive, 
potentialistic, anti-essentialist and a ‘bad’ mainstream, over-coded, object-centrist. If there is anything that 
the practice of animation makes clear, it is that there is a fine line running between these positions. As we 
have already seen, Blackton’s work is darkly subversive in its approach to stereotypical characterisation, 
and it is well known that animation, even in its most commercial form, has had a long and complex 
involvement with issues of race and gender. If the content of Blackton’s animations and sketches was not 
enough, his relation to identity becomes further complicated when we consider his habit of sometimes 
performing his lightning sketching routine dressed in drag (Crafton, 1993: 51-52). Perhaps there is a sense 
in which we might position Blackton - despite being in some sense ‘on the wrong side’ in relation to this 
discussion of representation, caricature and overcoding - to have had developed a sense of what Judith 
Butler describes as the ‘performativity’ of social roles, categories and essences (Butler, 2009). Indeed, a 
similar logic might go some way towards clarifying Deleuze’s seemingly inexplicable penchant for the 
comedian, Benny Hill. In his television interview with Claire Parnet, Deleuze, in the context of a discussion 
of cinema and culture, describes the British comic as having been in the possession of ‘an idea’. In 
attempting to shed light upon this somewhat perplexing statement, John Mullarkey (2008), has drawn 
attention to a number of aspects of the chase sequence that closed every episode of the Benny Hill show. 
Mullarkey begins by noting how the ‘speeding up’ of characters resulting from the under-cranking of the 
filmic apparatus resulted in a time image that was comic in the Bergsonian sense of the term. Mullarkey 
goes on (in a somewhat tongue in cheek fashion) to depict these chases as Deleuzian ‘lines of flight’. He 
notes how, during these closing sequences, Hill does not, in fact, chase women (as is most often assumed). 
Rather, in all of these sequences, Hill races ahead, slowly drawing a crowd of chasers – these include 
stereotypical depictions of policemen, burglars, farmers, along with numerous stereotyped and often 
fetishised representation of women. Over the course of the chase, Hill typically encounters a range of 
obstacles, such as hedges, or clothing hanging on a washing line, which often afford the potential for 
disguise (typically through adopting the conventions of another form of caricature). There is something 
broadly cartoonish about Hill’s chase sequences, and their transgression of gender codes that would seem 
to align them with divergent aspects of Cohl and Blackton’s animation practice. With this in mind, it is 
interesting that Deleuze’s alleged dislike of animation would seem to dissipate, or to become subject to 
modification as the ‘cartoon’ is brought into relation or encounter with a (live) action image. Perhaps it was 
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this intersection that, for Deleuze, constituted Hill’s ‘idea’ - ultimately expressing affects which Deleuze 
describes as both ‘troubling’ and ‘amusing’. Interestingly, the very possibility of this act of combination 
would seem to be dependent upon some kind of separation of what is cartoonish from the live-action film 
– a fact which would seem ultimately to contest Deleuze’s notion presented at the beginning of this paper, 
that animation should be considered a mere subset of the cinematic.  
 
A Deleuzian Theory of Trans-form-ation 
 
If Hill’s chase sequence can be considered a line of flight, then the same might be said of Cohl’s flat, 
projected canvas. In Cohl’s animation, escape, disguise and transformation abound. In outlining his 
philosophy of language in The Logic of Sense, Deleuze begins to develop a mischievous, rather esoteric, 
quasi-Leibnizian picture of ontological relation, which emphasises the intensive play of inverted Platonic 
form-like infinitives (Deleuze, 1990: 181-186). Indeed, we might position the resulting ontology as a 
Deleuzian theory of ‘trans-forms’. Whilst Deleuze’s notion of a chaotic play of infinitives could easily be 
brought to bear upon the predominantly kinetic qualities of abstract animation, it likewise has a strong 
affinity with the animation of Cohl. That is to say, when observing Cohl’s film, it is as if we experience a 
falling, an inflating, a cutting, a floating alongside any clearly defined sense of characterisation. Indeed, 
following the process philosophical treatment of objects and organisms as meta-stable rhythms, we might 
likewise extend this verbing to likewise encompass a clowning, a bottling or a policing. 
 
Despite the strange kinetic Platonism that is expressed in The Logic of Sense, there remains an affinity here 
with the genetic view of becoming presented in Deleuze’s roughly contemporaneous Difference and 
Repetition. The ontology of Difference and Repetition is governed by difference-driven processes, with 
differential relations functioning as elements of potentiality that work topologically upon the actual. Whilst 
these variant ontologies are undoubtedly similar (and I think that a good case could be made that these 
works were simply developed for different philosophical audiences), there is arguably a stronger sense of 
internalism at work in The Logic of Sense. That is to say, its Leibnizian ontology is primarily subtractive - 
with actual subject positions being selected from a hyper-connected background. Accordingly, we can 
locate a strongly syncretist tendency that is operative within the resulting metaphysics – which remains 
stylistically in tune with Cohl, despite the sharpness of his animated line. That is to say, whilst there is an 
absence of ‘smoke’, ‘erasure’ or ‘smearing’ in Cohl’s animation, it is nevertheless strongly syncretic in 
character. 
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Syncretic ontologies are characterised by a generalised diffusion of the world. For an elephant to transform 
into a ballerina, for instance, it must first morph or recede into an indeterminate mass – a quality that the 
Object-Oriented Philosopher, Graham Harman has disparagingly described, in more specifically 
ontological context, as a ‘cosmic lump of molten slag’ (Cavalier, 2015: 50; Harman, 2011: 299). A similar 
situation occurs in the context of ‘single line’ animation, where the image often transitions through a ‘flat-
line’ state (out of which anything could emerge). Thus, Cohl’s ontological commitments would seem to be 
most significantly embodied not at the level of narrative but rather at the level of style. That is to say, just 
as Logic of Sense and Difference and Repetition might be seen as companion volumes with different kinds 
of ontological emphasis, the syncretic dimension of animation is itself balanced by its own genetic 
counterpart. Thus, the Deleuzian animation theorist Erik S. Jenkins has drawn attention to the way in with 
the transformability of animation playfully exploits the viewer’s ability to perceive form and trajectory and 
to anticipate movement (Jenkins, 2016: 87). Indeed, if we keep this genetic-syncretic tension in mind, 
Cohl’s animation can be seen to play out or dramatise the fundamental tension between relational 
integration and relational differentiation that occurs in much process philosophical thinking. This is also 
apparent in films as diverse as La-Línea, The Red Thread and Dipdap. 
Jenkins likewise emphasises the way in which it is characteristic of our experience of animation, that we 
know it to be false but feel it to be true (Jenkins, 2016: 90). One of the most interesting and idiosyncratic 
aspects of Cohl’s animation is the way in which it revels in relation as experiential transition. According to 
the contemporary Deleuzian philosopher James Williams, it is in the ebb and flow of our aesthetic and 
emotional life that we can locate our most intimate connection with the operation of the pre-individual, 
intensive, forces that constitute the virtual. Williams points to the way in which our emotions ‘shade into 
one another”, ‘envelop’ or ‘cover one another over’ (Williams, 2003: 8). Indeed, we might extend Williams 
comments – through Deleuze’s notion of Hitchcock’s ‘relation image’ - to consider the experiential 
transitions that accompanies other moments of radical relational change (Deleuze, 2005: 203-205). These 
might include the vertiginous moment when the plot of a film ‘twists’ – and all of its relations are 
reconfigured - or the moment of abductive inference that occurs when something feels anomalous or out of 
place, the moment of aspect dawning in a gestalt shift - or the pronounced, disorienting kinetic-experiential 
effects of Optical Art (Op Art).  
References to Op Art in the Work of Deleuze and Guattari 
Op Art is a style of abstract visual art, perhaps most iconically, associated with the work of the British Artist 
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Bridget Riley. It typically employs static geometric lines placed in very precise mathematical relationships 
in order to produce the perception of chaotic, pulsing or swelling movements as the image rendered on the 
canvas resonates with the viewer’s perceptual system. Deleuze and Guattari make scant reference to Op Art 
throughout their corpus. This is perhaps because it seemingly lacks any political context. However, if we 
consider such imagery in relation to Deleuze’s claim that philosophy needs to focus its attention upon 
molecular processual movement – upon ‘movement in itself, or relation per se rather than focusing on the 
object moved or the things related’ (Cull, 2009: 71), there is a sense in which, in its purity of movement, 
Op Art could be positioned as the most political of arts. This resonance is not lost on Deleuze-Guattari – 
indeed on the brief occasions when Op Art is addressed, it is evoked as an ethical ideal, in the context of 
describing ‘actual’ forms of political practice. In their discussion of the political significance of quilt 
making in A Thousand Plateaus, they suggest that “the recurrence of a [single element] frees uniquely 
rhythmic values ... an amorphous, nonformal space prefiguring Op Art.” They go on to suggest, in a 
formulation that neatly captures the qualities of both the paintings of Bridgit Riley, and Cohl’s anarchic 
relational escape: 
It is as though a smooth space emanated, sprang from a striated space, but not without a correlation 
between the two, a recapitulation of one in the other, a furtherance of one through the other. Yet 
the complex difference persists. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2005: 477) 
Whilst many of the potentialistic examples cited in the essay refer to hand-drawn animation, it would be a 
mistake to think that this is in any sense a necessary requirement. Rather, following William James and 
Thomas Lamarre, we should note the connection between the line and the relation. Indeed, Lamarre, has 
spent much time exploring layering and compositing in potentialistic terms. Given their connection to 
industrialised animation production, it is most tempting to think of the process of layering as a process of 
striation relating to the expedient production of animated imagery. In contrast to this, as Torre notes, 
Lamarre has become interested in the choreographing of relations between the ‘invisible interstice between 
layers’ (Torre 2017: 51). Lamarre seems particularly interested in the way in which a particular kind of 
relational choreography would seem to usurp the mobile camera. Lamarre contrasts a Cartesian style of 
layered animation that attempts to provide volumetric depth and mimic aspect of the live action film, with 
a ‘superflat’ style of compositing that gives rise to an image where ‘figure and background are equally 
vibrant, equally present’ and where ‘all grounds appear on the surface’ (Lamarre, 2009: 126). Lamarre 
notes how superflat composition pushes all forces of movement to the surface in the form of ‘surface depths’ 
that have ‘potential energies or potential forces’(Lamarre, 2009: 127). As a consequence, Lamarre suggests 
that any element in the resulting image may serve to draw a line of sight, or to generate a field of potential 
depth. In this sense, the superflat image, in its density of information, would seem to institute a form of 
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syncresis that is nevertheless sharp and strongly contoured as opposed to the modes of selective blur or 
chiaroscuro that are more typically associated with syncretic forms of representation. Accordingly, in this 
mode of animated expression there are strong resonances and affinities with Cohl’s equaly flat and 
frenetically animated plane. 
Torre, Blackton and (In)Animate Semiotics 
I have hinted throughout this paper that there is something eerily fitting about the title of Blackton’s film – 
Humorous Phases of Funny Faces – and I have attempted to engage with it from the perspective of 
Deleuze’s sole authored writings on the close-up and his collaborative work with Guattari on political 
faciality. Whilst there is clearly some semblance of life within Blackton’s animation - specifically in the 
features of the face, it is (for the most part) a life that takes place with strong borders and clearly defined 
boundaries. Though (very-nearly) taking place in close-up, Blackton’s work lacks the subtlely and micro-
movements required to instantiate the affection image discussed in Deleuze’s early writings on cinema, 
whilst it leans all too readily towards Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘faciality’. Accordingly, Blackton’s 
films might be considered too rigid in their mode of affection - ultimately producing a highly facialised 
mode of comedy – which recalls Bergson’s notion of laughter as ‘something mechanical encrusted upon 
the living’ (Schaffer, 2006: 480; Bergson, 2005: 31), whilst nevertheless serving to fuel oppressive modes 
of organisation. On the subject of racism, Deleuze and Guattari note: 
 
Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance to the White man’s face, which 
endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, 
sometimes tolerating them at given place under given conditions, in a ghetto, or sometimes erasing 
them from the wall, which never abides alterity (Deleuze and Guattari, 2005: 178). 
 
Perusing the history of animation it is clear that the cinema – and specifically the cinema of animation is 
one such place where both the toleration and the overcoding of such non-conformist faces is combined into 
a monstrous repetition. Whilst the idea of the caricature serves as a useful metaphor for the Deleuzo-
Guattarian concept of faciality itself, we must not forget that for Deleuze and Guattari, faciality operates as 
a generalised feature of perception – as an institution of illusory norms and essences to the exclusion of 
alterity. Indeed, there is a sense in which both Blackton and Cohl produced extra-ordinary modes of 
experience and we have seen how they could each be said to rally affect but in the service of antithetical 
ends. Thus, Cohl’s animation could be said to function as a Deleuzo-Guattarian ‘probe head’ – inducing a 
stuttering and stammering of existing languages in order to deterritorialise the binary regimes that are 
reinforced in the work of animators such as Blackton. In contrast to Cohl, Blackton’s animations, though 
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equally subversive in their means of operation – are in some sense duplicitous in their mode of capture. 
That is to say, they operate rhetorically, employing a highly affective register as a means of further 
entrenching extant modes of representation. Interestingly, from a Deleuzian perspective, something very 
similar might be said of the process-cognitivism of Torre, where the language of vital process is coupled 
with a generalised mode of representational form. Arguably, each constructs a seemingly vital plane whilst 
infusing it with a peculiarly inanimate form of semiotics – resulting, in both cases, in a mere semblance, or 
illusion, of life.  
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